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  • 23 March 2016 March

    From 23 March 2016 12:00 To 23 March 2016 14:00

    Işık Sarıhan (Central European University & University of Fribourg)

    How Relevant is Neuroscience to Philosophy of Mind?

    Room: Enzo Paci

    The interaction between neuroscience and philosophy have two main aspects. One concerns the philosophers’ interest in the issues that arise within neuroscience, the findings of the field and the claims made by neuroscientists, and the philosophers’ function as a conceptual and logical corrector or aide towards a more accurate science. The other aspect concerns the relevance of the findings of ...

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  • 31 March 2016 March

    From 31 March 2016 12:00 To 31 March 2016 12:00

    Massimiliano Cappuccio

    What are skills, and what does disrupt skillful performance? A portable dynamic EEG study on choking effect

    Room: Sala Seminari

    What are embodied skills, how do we learn them, and what psychological factors disrupt them? The study we are conducting at the Interdisciplinary Cog Sci Lab of UAE University addresses these issues by complementing behavioral experimentation with the data collected through a portable dynamic wireless EEG system. Our approach targets skill disruption (aka “choking effect”) as a way into more f...

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  • 16 May 2016 May

    From 16 May 2016 14:00 To 16 May 2016 16:00

    Garrett Mindt (Central European University)

    The Problem with the ‘Information’ in Integrated Information Theory

    Room: Enzo Paci

    Giulio Tononi’s proposed theory of consciousness – Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of Consciousness – presents an interesting advance in the scientific study of consciousness. Tononi suggests that consciousness is quantifiable in both quantity and quality in terms of integrated information. Accordingly, information is one of IIT’s two foundational pillars (alongside integration) and if...

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  • 25 October 2016 October

    From 25 October 2016 13:00 To 25 October 2016 15:00

    Francesca Forle (San Raffaele, Milano)

    Movement in Music. An Enactive Account of Music Dynamic Qualities

    Room: Sala Enzo Paci

    Music moves us, both emotionally and physically. We are often more or less physically drawn into music, for instance in tapping along with a rhythm or, obviously, in dancing. In moving with music, we can come to bodily feel musical dynamism and expressive features, often having a more vivid perceptual experience than one we can have when just sitting on a chair. These phenomenological traits make ...

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  • 08 November 2016 November

    From 08 November 2016 13:00 To 08 November 2016 15:00

    Antonella Tramacere (Georg-August-Universität - Lichtenberg-Kolleg, Institute for Advanced Study, Göttingen)

    Mirror neurons in the tree of life: A mosaic evolution hypothesis of the social brain

    Room: Sala Enzo Paci

    I will approach the evolution of the social brain, by focusing on the properties of mirror neurons (MNs), which constitute one of its important parts. I will offer a novel, unifying, and testable account of MNs evolution according to the available data, integrating a substantial amount of apparently discordant research, including the plasticity of MNs during development, their adaptive value and t...

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  • 15 November 2016 November

    From 15 November 2016 13:00 To 15 November 2016 15:00

    Sofia Bonicalzi (UCL, Institute for Advanced Studies, London)

    Free will and mental causation

    Room: Sala Enzo Paci

    The problem of mental causation lies at the core of the interaction between neuroscience and philosophy of mind. However, one might doubt whether the two disciplines are dealing with the same conceptual issues. In philosophy of mind, the interest for mental causation often grows from the dispute between compatibilist and incompatibilist perspectives about metaphysical determinism and free will...

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  • 22 November 2016 November

    From 22 November 2016 13:00 To 22 November 2016 15:00

    Sam Clarke (University of Oxford)

    Don’t Fail the Module! On the assessment of Fodor’s modular/non-modular distinction

    Room: Sala Enzo Paci

    Jerry Fodor has famously, and persistently, argued that the human mind is made up of modular and non-modular cognitive systems. Typically, this is understood as the claim that some (but only some) cognitive systems (the modular ones) display a cluster of properties to some interesting extent (e.g. informational encapsulation, inaccessible processing, shallow outputs, and so on). But this is a mist...

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  • 29 November 2016 November

    From 29 November 2016 13:00 To 29 November 2016 15:00

    Janko Nesic (University of Fribourg)

    Ego as an individual substance

    Room: Sala Enzo Paci

    According to Gurwitch’s (1941) canonical distinction there are egological and non-egological theories of consciousness. An egological theory would maintain that, when I watch a film, there is a self or ego being aware of itself as an ego watching a film, it is a metaphysical and phenomenological truth that every experience is for a subject. Non-egological theory sees this experience as an anonym...

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  • 06 December 2016 December

    From 06 December 2016 13:00 To 06 December 2016 15:00

    Sam Cloake (University of Liverpool)

    The Concept of Perceptual Experience and the Limits of Representationalism

    Room: Sala Enzo Paci

    In the past fifteen years the widespread assumption in analytic philosophy of perception that perceptual experience can be analysed in terms of a subject’s relation to representational content has been challenged (Travis 2004, Brewer 2006), and an alternative theoretical approach – ‘naïve realism’ – put forward (Brewer 2011; Martin 2002, 2004). According to this alternative, the phenome...

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  • 13 December 2016 December

    From 13 December 2016 13:00 To 13 December 2016 15:00

    Andrea Polonioli (University of Birmingham)

    The adaptive rationality of confabulation(s)

    Room: Sala Enzo Paci

    In 2011, the Edge Foundation posed the following question to dozens of academics, writers, and intellectuals: ‘What scientific concept would improve everybody’s cognitive toolkit?’ They received nearly 200 responses on a variety of topics, ranging from evolutionary biology and theoretical physics to economics and psychology. Interestingly, cognitive psychologist Fiery Cushman argued tha...

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  • 20 December 2016 December

    From 20 December 2016 13:00 To 20 December 2016 15:00

    Émile Thalabard, Matthias Michel (Paris-Sorbonne, SND)

    The overflow argument and the global workspace theory of consciousness

    Room: Sala Enzo Paci

    In the debate on the nature of consciousness, the sparse view is opposed to the rich view. On the sparse view, consciousness is a global phenomenon in the brain (i.e., involving both sensory and executive systems), it is constituted by cognitive access, and it depends on the attentional resources of working memory. On the rich view, consciousness is not identical with the encoding of informati...

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  • 10 January 2017 January

    From 10 January 2017 13:00 To 10 January 2017 15:00

    Valentina Petrolini (University of Cincinnati)

    Are Mental Disorders Continuous with Healthy Functioning? A New Proposal for a Dimensional Model in Philosophy of Psychiatry

    Room: Sala Enzo Paci

    In this talk I put forward a novel approach to psychopathology that aims to describe and classify mental disorders in a dimensional way. This step proves crucial in providing a defense of what has recently come to be known as the Continuity Thesis (CT) in philosophy of psychiatry (see Bortolotti 2009). I believe a convincing defense of CT should be two-fold. First, it has to provide a model of men...

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  • 17 January 2017 January

    From 17 January 2017 13:00 To 17 January 2017 15:00

    Gabriele Ferretti (University of Urbino, University of Antwerp)

    Visual Representations in Action

    Room: Sala Enzo Paci

    It is easy to claim that the hottest debate in contemporary philosophy of mind and of perception is about whether the mind perceptually represents the properties of the world and, provided that a positive answer is possible, the question is about which properties of the world are represented in perception (Siegel 2006; Nanay 2013). That said, several philosophers claim that we perceptually re...

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